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WHEN DUTY CALLS: SHOULD THE DUTY OF MAJORITY
TO MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THE
NEW REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT?
Tiffany Sturgis Mikkelson'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Mississippi Legislature recently adopted the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act (RUPA), which became effective on January 1, 2005.2 The
Revised Act made several significant changes to partnership law, including
the addition of section 404, which provides specific rules concerning a part-
ner's duty of loyalty and care.3 As a result of prior case law applying part-
nership duty to closely held corporations, the question arises as to what
effect RUPA will have on the duty in closely held corporations. 4 This
Comment will address the previous treatment of duties in both partner-
ships and closely held corporations and attempt to predict the effect of the
RUPA on the duty in closely held corporations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is Duty?
Fiduciary duty is a contractual term-primarily the duty of unselfish-
ness-that applies in a situation where a principal delegates management
power to an agent.' In this type of situation the agent may have the incen-
tive to use control to benefit herself rather than the principal.6 One way
for the principal to protect his interests is to impose upon the agent a gen-
eral "fiduciary duty of unselfishness."7 This fiduciary relationship is a rela-
tionship of "trust and confidence" arising by the principal placing the
control over his property in the hands of the agent.'
1. J.D., Mississippi College School of Law, 2005. The author is currently an associate at Wat-
kins Ludlam Winter & Stennis, P.A., in Jackson, Miss. She thanks Professor Cecile C. Edwards for her
guidance in the writing of this Comment.
2. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-13-101 et seq. (adopted Apr. 29, 2004 and effective from and after
Jan. 1, 2005).
3. Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 § 404 (2004).
4. See discussion infra Sec. III.B.
5. Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements, 37 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 927, 937 (2004).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
75, 80 (2004).
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An agreement to enter into a fiduciary relationship generates both a
duty of loyalty and a duty of care.9 While these duties are strikingly differ-
ent, they relate to and overlap with each other.1° The duty of care is often
articulated as follows:
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to per-
form the director's or officer's functions in a manner that he
or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent
person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like
position and under similar circumstances.'1
A second duty owed to the corporation is a multifaceted duty of loy-
alty, of good faith, a central sphere of which has been recently labeled as
the duty of fair dealing. 2 As one court expressed:
[T]he duty goes beyond ... and is coextensive with the legit-
imate, enduring interests of the corporation. Loyalty to
those interests is the corporation's due. The duty of loyalty
takes no canonical form. It is as complex as corporate inter-
ests and officer temptations and means of descent from
grace.' 3
The extent and nature of these two duties vary according to each busi-
ness relationship and the contractual agreements within the business. In
addressing issues relating to fiduciary obligations, courts most often rely on
statutory language as well as case law from their own and other
jurisdictions.
B. Importance of Duty in Closely Held Corporations
A closely held corporation is defined as a "corporation having fifty or
fewer shareholders where the management operates in an informal manner
akin to a partnership."' 4 While holders of stock in a pubic corporation can
readily sell their stock when disagreements in management issues arise,
shareholders in small, closely held corporations usually do not have an
9. Id. (noting the tension that these two duties create: "[Tihese two competing claims reflect a
tension between satisfying the duty of loyalty and promoting the duty of care, duties that wind around
each other like a double helix comprising the fiduciary obligation.").
10. Omnibank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607 So. 2d 76, 84 (Miss. 1992).
11. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPALS oF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & REC-
OMMENDATIONS, § 4.01(a) (proposed final draft 1992). See Derouen v. Murray, 604 So. 2d 1086, 1092
(Miss. 1992).
12. Omnibank of Mantee, 607 So. 2d at 90. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 11, at § 5.01. See also Derouen, 604 So. 2d 1086; Hill v. Se. Floor Covering Co., 596 So. 2d 874, 877
(Miss. 1992).
13. Ominbank of Mantee, 607 So. 2d at 90.
14. Hall v. Dillard, 739 So. 2d 383, 386 (Miss. App. 1999).
[VOL. 25:171
RUPA AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
open market for selling shares.15 Because there is no market for close cor-
porate stock, these shareholders are essentially trapped. Deciding to form
the business as a corporation rather than a partnership will not relieve the
business operation of fiduciary obligations.
16
The unique characteristics of a closely held corporation, including the
small number of shareholders, the lack of a market for corporate stock, and
the considerable majority shareholder participation in the corporation's
management, create the potential for majority shareholders to abuse and
disadvantage minority shareholders.1 7 Judge John H. Doyle told a story
that illustrates this potential for abuse: "In 1893, a prominent Eastern
newspaperman was asked, 'Sir, what are the shares of your company
worth?' His reply[:] 'There are 51 shares that are worth $250,000. There
are 49 shares that are not worth a --. "18 The minority interest in
closely held corporations is at substantial risk due to the conduct of the
majority. This is an extremely dangerous position for the minority share-
holder because the owners have the potential to completely lose their in-
vestment. 19 Adherence by majority shareholders to the "fiduciary duty of
strict fairness" is especially significant in the framework of closely held
corporations.2 °
Most often, closely held corporations arise out of personal relation-
ships such as between family members or friends. 1 Ironically, it is this type
of enterprise that becomes a frequent setting for the manipulation of mi-
nority shareholders when disagreements cause the underlying personal re-
lationship to fall apart.2 This vulnerability of minority shareholders in the
context of closely held corporations is well documented and serves as the
basis for courts to impose a fiduciary duty upon the majority requiring it to
act with the utmost good faith and loyalty in the business transactions.23
1II. CORRELATION BETWEEN PARTNERSHIPS AND CLOSELY
HELD CORPORATIONS
Numerous courts, including the Mississippi Supreme Court, have ac-
knowledged the similarities between closely held corporations and partner-
ships.24  Courts often impose upon shareholders in closely held
15. 12B FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIoNs § 5713 (2004).
16. Id.
17. Camille Romero, The Fiduciary Duties Owed in a New Mexico Closely Held Corporation:
Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 34 N.M. L. REV. 181, 186 (2004).
18. Arthur D. Spratlin Jr., Modern Remedies for Oppression in the Closely Held Coporation, 60
Miss. L.J. 405, 406 (1990) (citing Humphreys v. Winous Co., 133 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ohio 1956) (quoting
from Judge John H. Doyle's address to the Ohio State Bar in 1893)).
19. Id. at 407. See The Strict Good Faith Standard-Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders in
Close Corporations, 33 MERCER L. REV. 595, 596 (1982) (discussing potential abuses of minority be-
cause of majority's stronger position).




24. Romero, supra note 17, at 187 (citing Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505,515
n.17 (Mass. 1975). See Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167 (Miss. 1989).
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corporations the same fiduciary duties that partners owe each other be-
cause of the striking resemblance between close corporations and partner-
ships as well as the risks to the minority interests in a close corporation. 5
A. The Partnership Finest Duty of Loyalty and Care
In 1928, Judge Cardozo, writing for the Court of Appeals of New
York, announced what is now one of the most often quoted statements of
partnership law-"Many forms of conduct permissible in a workday world
for those acting at arm's length[ ] are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties."'26 Meinhard v. Salmon held that partners in a partnership owe to one
another the duty of the finest loyalty, which is not simply honesty alone but
rather "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive."27 Unfortunately, re-
curring references to directors' and officers' "fiduciary duties" imply a less
than helpful or accurate description of such duties, and Cordozo's quote
often sounds so good that one seldom stops to decide what exactly it
means.
28
Partnership agreements are often used to create the rights and obliga-
tions of the partnership.29 In addition to the rights, duties, and liabilities
included in the partnership agreement, there is the inherent fiduciary duty
between partners to act in the "best interests" of the partnership when car-
rying out the partnership's business.30 Because the degree of fiduciary du-
ties owed between partners varies with each particular circumstance, the
court must thoroughly analyze the partnership relationship in order to de-
termine the applicable standard for whether there has been a breach of a
partner's fiduciary duty.
3 1
B. Application of Partnership Duty to Closely Held Corporations
There is a long history of imposing fiduciary duties upon shareholders
in close corporations.32 The United States Supreme Court first acknowl-
edged fiduciary obligations between majority and minority shareholders of
25. See Donohue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
26. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. App. 1928).
27. Id.
28. James L. Robertson, The Law of Corporate Governance: Coming of Age in Mississippi, 65
Miss. L.J. 477 (1996).
29. Richard Kan, Fiduciary Relationship Among Partners, 29 ILL. LAW & PRAC. PARTNERSHIP
§ 32 (July 2004).
30. Id.
31. Nature of Obligation Between Partners, 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 77 (2004).
32. L. Clark Hicks Jr., Corporations-Fiduciary Duty-In a Close Corporation, a Majority Share-
holder Owes a Fiduciary Duty Towards the Minority When Seeking a Controlling Share, 60 Miss. L.J.
425, 426 n.9 (1990). In the development of corporate law concerning fiduciary duties of shareholders,
courts established very early that the managers and directors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty of
good faith to the corporation and its shareholders. See, e.g., Elliot v. Baker, 80 N.E. 450 (Mass. 1907);
Gibson v. Manuel, 534 So. 2d 199, 203 (Miss. 1988) (fiduciary duty of corporate directors and officers
required defendant to discharge duty in "good faith and with that degree of care" dictated by such a
duty); Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (Miss. 1979) (holding that "self-dealing" where
corporation and fiduciary bargain on opposite sides of a transaction automatically raises presumptive
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a corporation in Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert.33 The Court established
the requirement that majority shareholders who control the corporation's
stock are obligated to consider the minority interest.34  However, the
Court's imposition of fiduciary duties between majority and minority
shareholders did not receive immediate acceptance in the context of closely
held corporations.3"
In Fought v. Morris, the Mississippi Supreme Court had the opportu-
nity to examine the issue of whether defendants in a closely held corpora-
tion breached a fiduciary duty by not following the terms of a stock
redemption agreement.36 The Fought court held that shareholders in a
close corporation have a fiduciary duty of good faith towards each other,
and that a majority shareholder's attempt to gain a controlling interest
must be "intrinsically fair" to the minority shareholder. 37 The opinion be-
gan by reviewing prior Mississippi case law to determine if there was direct
precedent on which to base the analysis of the issue. One such case was
Ross v. Biggs, where the Mississippi Supreme Court held that stockholders
in a family corporation do not "bear toward each other the same relation-
ship of trust and confidence which prevails in partnerships."38 The Fought
court recognized that this statement fails to consider the fact that the share-
holders, directors, and managers of closely held corporations are often the
same people.39
The Mississippi Supreme Court had not discussed this subject since
Ross, so it looked to other jurisdictions that had.4" In Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted the resem-
blance between close corporations and partnerships, and imposed a "strict
good faith standard" upon shareholders in close corporations.4' The Dona-
hue court stated that the management standards and responsibilities of
shareholders in closely held corporations are substantially the same as
those among partners, and are stricter than those of publicly held corpora-
tions.42 The Fought court also discussed Orchard v. Covelli, which involved
a close corporation whose majority shareholders did not act fairly towards
conflict of interests); Am. Empire Life Ins. Co. v. McAdory, 319 So. 2d 237, 240-41 (Miss. 1975) (corpo-
rate officers who turned corporate opportunity to their personal benefit breached fiduciary duty owed
to corporation and shareholders). See generally W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 838 (rev. perm. ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988) (all jurisdictions now recognize fiduciary duty
between officers and shareholders).
33. S. Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
34. Id. at 487-88.
35. See Hicks, supra note 32, at 428 n.16.
36. Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167 (Miss. 1989).
37. Id. at 171.
38. Id. at 169.
39. Id. at 170.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)).
42. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16. The Fought v. Morris opinion notes that Massachusetts
courts continued to apply this good faith standard in Hallaham v. Haltom Corp., 385 N.E.2d 1033
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
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the minority during dissolution of the corporation.43 The Orchard court
acknowledged the "vulnerability" of minority shareholders, and required
the controlling interest to act with a duty of loyalty and fairness to minority
shareholders. 4
The court in Fought followed the Orchard court's rationale and held
that the majority shareholder's action in a closely held corporation must be
"intrinsically fair" to the minority interest.45 Hence, shareholders in a close
corporation can hold each other to the same fiduciary duties of good faith
and loyalty as partners in a partnership.46 With this opinion, Mississippi
joined with the majority of jurisdictions who impose fiduciary obligations
on majority shareholders to minority shareholders in closely held corpora-
tions.47 Because courts have realized how minority shareholders in close
corporations differ from minority shareholders in publicly held corpora-
tions, many courts, including those in Mississippi, are recognizing a fiduci-
ary duty owed by the majority to the minority shareholders.48 However,
instead of developing a separate standard of fiduciary duties for sharehold-
ers in closely held corporations, courts in Mississippi and elsewhere are
analogizing closely held corporations to partnerships, probably because
each jurisdiction has well-developed partnership case law to serve as
precedent.49
C. Newly Defined Duty of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) added section 404,
General Standards of Partner's Conduct, in an effort to provide clarifica-
tion and definition to fiduciary obligations among partners in a partner-
ship.50 This section is structurally different from the previous version of the
Uniform Partnership Act, which only touches on a partner's duty of loyalty
and leaves further development of the fiduciary duties to the common law
of agency.51 Subsection 404(b) begins by classifying a partner's duty of loy-
alty to the partnership and the other partners as limited to the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it
any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the
43. Fought, 543 So. 2d at 170 (citing Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984)).
44. Orchard, 590 F. Supp. at 1557 (stating that this vulnerability stems from several factors in-
cluding that the majority is able to dictate the manner in which the corporation is run, that the shares
are not publicly traded, and that the minority interest is unattractive to a prospective purchaser).
45. Fought, 543 So. 2d at 171.
46. Id.
47. See Retzer v. Retzer, 578 So. 2d 580, 594 (Miss. 1991) (noting the difference in duties existing
between majority and minority shareholders in publicly held and closely held corporations). See also
Hall v. Dillard, 739 So. 2d 383 (Miss. App. 1999) (holding that stockholders of close corporations must
bear toward each other the same relationship of trust and confidence that prevails in partnerships).
48. See Spratlin, supra note 18, at 412.
49. See Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 457 (N.M. 2002). See also Romero, supra
note 17, at 188.
50. Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 § 404 (2004).
51. § 404, 4 Uniform Laws Annotated 404, cmt. 1 (2004).
[VOL. 25:171
RUPA AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
conduct and winding up of the partnership business or de-
rived from a use by the partner of partnership property, in-
cluding the appropriation of a partnership opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the con-
duct or winding up of the partnership business as or on be-
half of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership;
and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the
conduct of the partnership business before the dissolution of
the partnership.52
Continuing the rule that partnership property assumed by the partner
is held for the benefit of the partnership, Subsection 404(b)(1) is premised
on UPA section 21(1). 53 While new to the Act, this specific mention of how
partnership property should be appropriated is simply a codification of the
existing case law on the issue.54 Subsection (b)(2) is derived from Sections
389 and 391 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, and subsection (b)(3),
derived from Section 303 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, is a re-
quirement that the agent act solely on behalf of the principal.
5
Subsection 404(c) is also new and establishes the duty of care that
partners owe to the partnership and to the other partners:
(c) A partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other
partners in the conduct and winding up of the partnership
business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a
knowing violation of law.
56
Even though the UPA does not include a statutory duty of care, some
courts acknowledge and impose a common law duty of care.5 7 The stan-
dard of care recognized by most courts and imposed by the RUPA is that of
gross negligence.58
Another important addition in section 404 is subsection 404(d), which
imposes upon all partners the obligation to perform their responsibilities
with good faith and fair dealing as defined within the Act, as well as with
any duties outlined in the partnership agreement. 59 This obligation is char-
acterized in RUPA as an "ancillary obligation" that affects a partner's ac-
tions whether arising under the partnership agreement or the Act.6' The
exact meaning of "good faith and fair dealing" is not precisely defined
52. § 404.




57. See § 404, 4 Uniform Laws Annotated 404, cmt. 3 (2004).
58. Id.
59. Id. at cmt. 4.
60. Id.
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under current case law. The drafters of the RUPA chose to leave the terms
undefined, enabling courts to review the specific circumstances of each case
before establishing what those words mean.61
The most recent version of the Uniform Laws Annotated Uniform
Partnership Act summarizes those states that have adopted the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, many with their own variations from the original
text.62 Mississippi is not included in the Uniform Laws Annotated sum-
mary because of its very recent adoption and effective date of January 1,
2005.63 As of this writing, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia
have adopted RUPA.64 Due to the short time period the changes have
been in place, commentary and law discussing the application and future
consequences of the RUPA is scant.
IV. EFFECT OF THE NEW RUPA DUTY ON CLOSELY
HELD CORPORATIONS
A review of the concept of duty in both partnerships and closely held
corporations, the case law applying the partnership duty to closely held
corporations, and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act changes to part-
nership duty raises the question: what effect, if any, does the RUPA have
on fiduciary obligations in closely held corporations? Do the duties change
according to the new RUPA-specific rules contained in section 404, or re-
main as before, unaffected by the new RUPA section? Even though this
seems like a clear question that must eventually be answered, there does
not appear to be a single case or legal commentary specifically answering it.
With that in mind, following are a few concerns that should be addressed
when a court is ultimately faced with the issue of deciding what effect the
RUPA has on the duty of majority to minority shareholders in closely held
corporations.
A major concern stems from the RUPA drafters' attempt to create a
comprehensive and exclusive rule encompassing a partner's fiduciary du-
ties. By attempting to draft a rule that categorizes a partner's duty into
sections and subsections, the unfortunate result may be that some aspects
of fiduciary duty were excluded. For example, some suggest that the
RUPA section 403 excluded the common law duty to disclose material in-
formation .6  Even if the drafters did not exclude any particular compo-
nents of fiduciary duties, the newly added section 404 may have the
unintended result of rendering partnership law unable to adapt to changes
61. Id.
62. § 404.
63. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-13-101 et seq. (adopted Apr. 29, 2004 and effective from and after Jan.
1, 2005).
64. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Partnership Act
(1994) (1997), available at http://www.nccusl.orglnccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa9497.
asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
65. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GEN-
ERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS §12:17 (2004) (also noting that there is a possible argument that a
disclosure obligation is included in the RUPA § 404(d) obligation of good faith and fair dealing).
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in business practices.66 Rather than setting broad guidelines, the Revised
Act attempted to define what is a permissible business practice and what is
a breach of fiduciary duties.67 Certainly when deciding how to define and
classify the fiduciary duties of majority to minority shareholders in a close
corporation, the goal would be to create broad guidelines rather than strict,
inflexible standards.
Despite these few concerns, there was a definite need to clarify and
provide some guidance as to what "the punctilio of an honor the most sen-
sitive means in relation to a partner's duties. Overall, the RUPA draft-
ers seem to have carefully studied the relationship between partners in a
partnership and established a set of rules on fiduciary duties that leaves
room for future development in the courts and that allows partnerships to
include fiduciary provisions in their individual partnership agreements.69
Placing closely held corporation duties in the context of the already estab-
lished precedent on partnership duty would provide guidance to courts. In
fact, the drafters of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act followed RUPA's
framework for partnership fiduciary duties when creating and drafting the
ULPA.7 ° Thus, any guidance, clarification, or structure the RUPA provides
to fiduciary duties of partnerships is available to apply in the context of
fiduciary duties in closely held corporations.
As noted above, a too-narrow definition of shareholder fiduciary du-
ties in closely held corporations would not be effective in resolving issues
of breach of duties, but some structure or definition is necessary in order
for shareholders to properly conduct business. Mississippi has already rec-
ognized the unique characteristics of closely held corporations and has im-
posed upon shareholders in close corporations the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care similar to those between partners in a partnership.71 If
they follow previous rationale and analysis, it seems that Mississippi courts
should find that the fiduciary obligations in closely held corporations will
change and adapt along with the partnership duties in RUPA. The RUPA
section 404 does not drastically overhaul partnership duties, but rather clar-
ifies and codifies existing common-law and case-law duties. Therefore,
Mississippi courts are likely to apply the new RUPA section that specifi-
cally outlines partnership duties to closely held corporation duties in an
effort to provide structure and clarification to closely held corporation law.
However, Mississippi should carefully approach the decision of how to
apply the new RUPA section on partnership duties to existing shareholder
duties in closely held corporations. The course that Mississippi corporate
law takes should be informed, and it should thoroughly consider the pros
66. J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The Want of a Theory, Again, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
719, 727 (2004).
67. Id.
68. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. App. 1928).
69. See Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 § 404, 4 Uniform Laws Annotated 404, cmt. 1 (2004).
See also CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 65.
70. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 66.
71. Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 171 (Miss. 1989).
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and cons of applying this heightened fiduciary duty to closely held corpora-
tions. Thus far it appears that courts, including Mississippi's, have been too
willing to extend partnership fiduciary principles in the close-corporation
context. While the close-corporation structure does in fact resemble that of
a partnership, there are critical differences between these two business as-
sociations that should be addressed. One difference is that partners are
agents of the partnership, and, as a result, have the legal ability to bind the
partnership for their actions. Another difference is that all partners have
personal, unlimited liability for partnership debts. Because the Uniform
Partnership Act recognizes the potential hazards of the unique partnership
relationship, it imposes fiduciary duties on all partners.
Shareholders in close corporations do not have the same interdepen-
dency relationships as partners in partnerships. Also, shareholders are not
liable for the debts of their corporation. These significant differences
should be carefully considered when deciding whether to impose partner-
ship fiduciary duties on shareholders of close corporations. While courts
are often quick to note the similarities between a close corporation and a
partnership, they sometimes fail to appreciate that partnership fiduciary
duties are tailored to the unique partnership relationship.
If faced with the decision of whether to apply the new RUPA partner-
ship duty section to close corporations and with the question of what effect
the new duty section will have on existing partnership law, Mississippi
courts should carefully examine the differences and similarities between
the two forms of business associations. They should analyze the conse-
quences of applying partnership duty to shareholders in close corporations.
Perhaps one approach would be to decide whether there should be any
special, judicially created rules to protect minority shareholders of closely
held corporations. A minority of courts and commentators suggests that
closely held corporations should use contractual mechanisms to protect
themselves rather than relying upon the courts to create special rules.
Shareholders in close corporations can use private contracting mechanisms
such as buy-sell agreements and supermajority requirements to protect
themselves. Treating the two business forms alike has the potential to un-
dermine the unique characteristics of the corporation and the partnership,
and can effectively deny society the full benefits inherent in the corporate
form.
Lastly, Mississippi courts should use caution to avoid stepping into the
role of the legislature when judicially creating fiduciary obligations be-
tween majority and minority shareholders of close corporations. If there is
a need to define or clarify the fiduciary obligations among shareholders in
close corporations, that task should fall on the shoulders of the state legis-
lature-not the judiciary.
[VOL. 25:171
RUPA AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
V. CONCLUSION
The last three decades have produced significant changes in how
courts look at and treat closely held corporations.7 2 As courts continue to
recognize the uniqueness of closely held corporations and the vulnerability
of their minority shareholders, they should use the RUPA treatment of
partnership duties as guidance, while also carefully considering the differ-
ences between partnerships and close corporations. Mississippi courts
should take the opportunity to reevaluate fiduciary duties of shareholders
in closely held corporations and decide whether it would be better to con-
tinue applying the partnership duty to shareholders or to leave that deci-
sion to the legislature. If Mississippi chooses to apply RUPA's new section
to the close corporation context there should be a developing body of case
law that could be used to analyze cases involving fiduciary duties in closely
held corporations. Only time will tell whether Mississippi courts will apply
the RUPA section 404 to closely held corporations, but when duty calls, the
court should approach the decision with caution and carefully consider the
consequences before applying the newly outlined duties of loyalty and care
to closely held corporations.
72. Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations, 66
WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (1988).
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